The discussion of the realities of the linguistic sign seems, in a way, widely over and done with in today’s society. It’s easy to get bogged down in neuro-solipsism, disregarding such basic factors as understanding or social function (or anything that can’t be analysed at the level of the single neuron). If we, in any self-respecting post-structuralist tradition (i.e. Barthes), doubt not just the receiver-interpreter, but also the sender-interpreter and any abstract illocutionary force, we must also come to doubt the nature of whatever is being transmitted and interpreted (at both ends). Since having a blog means there is no review, it’s possible to write whatever you feel like, and if the future proves you wrong, you just write something new and forget all about the past (or finish with a glorious pun so people forget the meaning of the whole post: it implodes and goes BOOM.).
I’ve had a little obsession with what feels like an “imploded” sign. In short, any “meaning” from a diachronic point of view (where we could possibly find the historical centre of Peirce’s onion, i.e. the nucleus of any given object of semiotic research, say, a linguistic sign) “implodes” at the point of synchronic analysis, and its meaning is scattered among any number of language users. Thus, the last “point of contact” before the arbitrary time of the implosion, constitutes whatever nucleus we can agree on when it comes to the meaning of the sign, or, for that matter, any linguistic expression. People like Alexander Bain would say that the nucleus is an abstract “Definition” (with a nice 19th century capital letter), but that is far too vague in order to have any consequences on the discussion, in part because definition implies explicit agreement, something which is notoriously hard to find among language users. If anything, though, it is perhaps possible to reach a, however small, conclusion about the fuzzy nucleus of meaning.
Reaching a conclusion about the nucleus of the imploded sign and concatenating its parts back together mentally (and also beyond the mental through semiosis) is perhaps only possible taking Peirce’s pragmatic maxim into account. Without a pragmatic approach to this, the sign would never reach its interpretants or receivers and would stay an undefined mental entity (possibly measurable in single neurons). We still speak and understand what other people mean, mostly.
Also, the imploded sign would also have to be approached pragmatically if translation is to be possible (which, according to Ricoeur, it is). This is a subject for another day, but it’s worth mentioning, since it’s something that’s easily affected by how we view signs. If it’s true, however, that the sign is in a constant “imploded” state, meaning really is deferred to the future. Imagine a written note hidden in a bottle in the middle of the ocean: the note still has meaning, but it’s not complete since there is no interpreter there to interpret it (and trees falling in the woods, and bla, bla, bla.). Meaning, again, is deferred to the future. Vincent Colapietro has this to say on the subject:
“The rational meaning of a proposition lies in the future in the sense
that this meaning is what would be revealed to an indefinite community in
the indefinite future. To limit either the scope of this community or the expanse
of this time would be to imprison rational meaning in such a constricted
confinement that such meaning would wither and die.” (Colapietro 2003)
This also sums it up very nicely. However, I think it’s nice to refer to the non-agentive action through which this has taken place, the implosion.
Also because it’s a pretty word. Mmm implosion. It sounds like an ointment for Lincoln FC supporters. HAR HAR GET IT!?
References:
Colapietro, V. (2003): Translating Signs Otherwise. In: Translation Translation. Ed.: Petrilli, S. Rodopi. Amsterdam. pp. 189-215.